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Abstract 
Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not 
affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool 
resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behavioral 
economic research indicates that the origin of a resource may affect the use of that 
resource. We investigate the potential role of resource origin by considering the 
appropriation of a common-pool resource after users have determined its productive 
capacity through contributions. Results indicate that resource origin does not 
significantly influence aggregate appropriation levels but that endogenous resource 
provision leads to individual strategic behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Social dilemmas have been a principal source of inquiry in the behavioral sciences for 
over half a century. In 1950, Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, scientists at the RAND 
Corporation, introduced a two-person social dilemma that was soon to be known as the 
prisoner's dilemma. A few years later, Paul Samuelson provided an initial 
characterization of the public good dilemma, an n-person social dilemma in which each 
individual may pay a cost that generates a benefit shared by all ( Samuelson, 1954). 
The commons dilemma was popularized soon afterwards by Garrett Hardin's “Tragedy 
of the Commons,” when he described an n-person social dilemma in which each 
individual may receive a benefit that imposes a cost shared by all ( Hardin, 1968). 
These seminal efforts set in motion an abundance of research that has produced a vast 
literature on social dilemmas. 
 
The fascination is warranted because, by presenting situations in which private and 
collective interest conflict, social dilemmas offer a powerful setting to explore 
fundamental questions of self-interest, cooperation, social norms and reciprocity within 
the broader purpose of improving social well-being. Indeed, considerable effort has 
been expended to better understand how behavioral and institutional elements can 
facilitate cooperative solutions and collective action (e.g., Baland and Platteau, 1996, 
Bischoff, 2007, Ostrom, 2000, Ostrom, 2006 and Varughese, 1999). As a result, 
research has moved beyond the notion that cooperative behavior is always thwarted by 
individual self-interest and can only be realized by externally imposed institutions of 
private property or government intervention (Fehr and Gächter, 2000 and Ostrom, 
2000). It is well-documented that people often exhibit cooperative behavior when 
conventional theory predicts otherwise, whether it is cooperating on the provision of 
public goods or the management of shared resources (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 
1998 and Lam, 1998). 
 
Much of our understanding of social dilemmas comes from the extensive experimental 
work on public goods and common-pool resources (CPRs). Since early experiments by 
Walker et al. (1990) confirmed theoretical predictions of overexploitation of CPRs, a 
vast literature has employed the same basic experimental framework to examine the 
institutional factors and behavioral levers that affect appropriation of CPRs. These 
papers address an array of issues such as resource uncertainty (e.g., Budescu et al., 
1995); collective choice and voting (e.g., Walker et al., 2000); externalities of spatially 
linked resources (Schnier, 2009); and communication (e.g., Ostrom, 2006). Surprisingly, 
the body of experimental work on CPRs almost exclusively relies on exogenously 
provided resources despite the fact not all resources are “manna from heaven.” CPRs 
are often endogenously determined by collective actions to improve and maintain the 
resource before choices are made on how to appropriate it (Ostrom et al., 1994). 
Members of user groups act collectively to develop and maintain irrigation systems that 
harness common water resources (Ostrom, 1996) and to cultivate common land for 
collective harvests (West, 2010). In fact, policies in many countries have explicitly 
shifted the provision of common resources to local user groups, as illustrated by the 
Ugandan government transferring the responsibility of de-silting the Doho Irrigation Rice 
Canals to local users (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002 and Sserunkuuma et al., 2008). 
 
We consider the case of such endogenously determined CPRs. More specifically, we 
examine whether appropriation of a CPR depends on whether its potential benefits are 
exogenously provided or endogenously determined. While theory suggests the origin of 
the CPR should not affect appropriation behavior, the literature provides considerable 
evidence that the origin of resources affects how people use those resources (Thaler, 
1985 and Arkes et al., 1995).1 In game-theoretic settings, the literature reports that 
individuals exhibit less cooperation and more self-interest when they must exert effort to 
secure resources (e.g. Cherry et al., 2002, Harrison, 2007 and Janssen et al., 2011). 
Research also indicates that the process of cooperating in a task may lead to greater 
cooperation in a different subsequent task (Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2003). Prior 
research therefore provides a basis to suspect appropriation behavior is influenced by 
the CPR being endogenously determined by a collective action rather than exogenously 
provided. Considering the prevalence of endogenously determined resources in the field 
and the reliance on exogenously provided resources in the lab, it is worth testing the 
theoretical presumption that resource origin does not affect appropriation. 
 
Endogenous provision also presents a unique opportunity to see if people identify and 
exploit opportunities for strategic reciprocity in order to motivate cooperation. For 
instance, members of the collective may punish free-riding in provision by over-
appropriating the resource. Alternatively, members may opt to signal cooperation or 
reward cooperative behavior by under-appropriating. Previous experimental studies on 
negative and positive reciprocity in social dilemmas indicate that cooperative behavior 
can be promoted when members of a collective have the option to punish other 
members for non-cooperative behavior (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000 and Rodriguez-
Sickert et al., 2008) or reward them for cooperative behavior (e.g., Andreoni et al., 
2003 and Sefton et al., 2007). Janssen et al. (2011), a rare exception in the CPR 
literature in that it examines both provision and appropriation, explores an analogue of 
the dictator game where downstream users of an irrigation system are dependent upon 
the appropriation decisions of upstream users. Though the authors’ experiment does 
not compare exogenously and endogenously determined resources, their findings do 
provide some indirect evidence of negative reciprocity in the provision and appropriation 
decisions of users. Our experimental design, which includes both exogenous and 
endogenous provision, allows us to determine the effect of resource origin on both 
individual strategic behavior and aggregate appropriation levels. 
 
 
2. Framework 
We extend the standard CPR game used by Walker et al. (1990) that has served as the 
framework for numerous CPR experiments. In the Walker et al. experiments, a group of 
n users plays a non-cooperative game in which each user makes an appropriation 
decision; users allocate an endowment between a CPR with exogenous productive 
capability and a private alternative. We extend this basic framework to consider 
endogenously determined productive capability by allowing each user to contribute 
some of her endowment toward increasing the return of the CPR. Users make provision 
and appropriation decisions in two separate stages and observe the outcome of 
provision before deciding on appropriation. 
 
2.1. Stage 1: provision 
At the beginning of each period, user i   is endowed with e   to be allocated between 
contributions, c  i, toward enhancing the return of the CPR and for use in the 
subsequent appropriation stage. If aggregate contributions meet a threshold, T  , the 
stock of the CPR is increased and users experience a higher rate of return on any given 
level of appropriation in the appropriation stage. Let the stock of the resource, 
S(Σi=1nci), take the value S  0 if contributions fall below the threshold 
(Σi=1nci<T) and value S  T > S  0 if contributions meet or exceed the threshold 
(Σi=1nci≥T). 
 
The threshold, T  , and size of the enhancement, S  T − S  0, are known to users. 
Aggregate contributions less than T   are wasted, as are the portion of contributions in 
excess of T  , so there are only two potential Nash equilibrium outcomes: 
Σi=1nci=0 and Σi=1nci=T. 
 
2.2. Stage 2: appropriation 
Users simultaneously allocate their remaining endowments between appropriation, a  i, 
from the CPR and investment, e   − c  i − a  i, in a private alternative. The aggregate 
return, R  , from the CPR is a function of aggregate appropriation, 
A=Σi=1nai, and the resource stock, S, where b is an exogenous functional parameter: 
 
(1)     
 
The individual return on appropriation, ri, is equal to an individual's share of total 
appropriation multiplied by the aggregate return: 
(2)     
 
The private alternative yields a constant rate of return to investment, w, so that an 
individual's return from investment in the private alternative is given by (e − ci − ai)w. 
Individual i's second stage problem, taking the appropriation decisions of the other 
users as given, is to maximize individual payoff, πi, over ai: 
 
(3)     
 
The unconstrained Nash equilibrium level of individual appropriation is given by: 
 
(4)     
 
Users anticipate Nash behavior in the appropriation stage of the game when making 
their decisions in the provision stage. Substituting (4) into the individual payoff in (3) and 
taking the difference in individual payoff when the resource is enhanced vs. 
unenhanced yields: 
 
(5)    
 
Recall that the only potential equilibrium outcomes for contributions are zero or the 
threshold ( Σi=1nci=0 or Σi=1nci=T). Intuitively, if the increase in 
payoff from the appropriation stage is less than the cost of enhancement (i.e., if Eq. (5) 
is negative) for a symmetric contribution, T  /n  , neither it nor any asymmetric 
contribution profile that achieves the threshold can be an equilibrium. In this case, the 
Nash equilibrium for provision is that each individual contributes nothing (c  i = 0, ∀i  ). 
On the other hand, if (5) is positive for c  i = T  , each player has an incentive to 
unilaterally enhance the resource by contributing T   if no other player contributes, so all 
contribution combinations that result in Σi=1nci=T are Nash equilibria. 
Finally, for the intermediate case where (5) is positive for c  i = T  /n   but negative for 
c  i = T  , contributions leading to either Σi=1nci=0 or Σi=1nci=T 
are Nash equilibria. 3 Moving forward, we focus on this intermediate and most 
interesting case where symmetric enhancement is beneficial for individuals playing 
strategies consistent with the Nash equilibrium concept but not so great as to make 
unilateral enhancement worthwhile. 
 
To conclude our discussion of the experimental framework we turn our attention to the 
provision mechanism through which resource enhancement is achieved. In this paper, 
we consider two mechanisms that are well-documented in the literature: a voting 
mechanism and a provision point mechanism (PPM). 
 
2.3. Voting mechanism 
With the voting mechanism, each user is able to vote for or against (i.e., “yes” or “no”) a 
mandate for each group member to contribute an equal share to enhance the CPR. If a 
majority votes “yes,” then ci = T/n, the resource is enhanced, and each user has her 
remaining endowment to allocate in the appropriation stage. If a majority votes “no,” 
then ci = 0, the resource remains unenhanced, and  
 
 
Fig. 1. Enhancement of the resource 
 
each user keeps her full endowment. Because users are better off through 
enhancement and pay no cost if the vote fails, voting “yes” is a weakly dominant 
strategy (if the voter was decisive, strictly dominant). Eliminating weakly dominated 
strategies yields a single symmetric equilibrium where each voter votes “yes,” and we 
would expect to observe provision and appropriation by each user of (ci = T/n, 
ai = ST − w/b(n + 1)). 
 
 
 
2.4. Provision point mechanism 
The other type of provision mechanism we test is a provision point mechanism (PPM) 
(see Bagnoli and McKee, 1991 for discussion on PPM experiments). With the PPM, 
each user has the opportunity to make a voluntary contribution toward CPR 
enhancement. If Σi=1nci≥T, the resource is enhanced, otherwise the CPR 
remains unenhanced. Because aggregate contributions below or above the threshold 
are wasted, we implement a PPM with no refund or rebate (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999), 
i.e., any contributions that individuals make are spent regardless of the provision 
outcome. For this implementation of the PPM there are two symmetric equilibria (c  i = 0 
and c  i = T  /n  ), and a multitude of asymmetric equilibria that all result in the threshold 
being exactly met Σi=1nci=T. Unlike with voting, failed contributions impose 
a cost and there is a free-riding incentive, so there is no weakly dominant strategy to 
contribute. Therefore with the PPM we would expect to observe average provision and 
appropriation by each user of either (ci = T/n, ai = ST − w/b(n + 1)) or (ci = 0, 
ai = S0 − w/b(n + 1)). 
 
 
3. Experimental design 
We parameterize the theory to develop explicit predictions, defining the following: n = 5, 
w = 5, b = 5/72, T = 100, S0 = 20, ST = 30, and e = 120. Fig. 1 4 shows the aggregate 
return functions for standard and enhanced states of the resource given these 
parameters. Comparing the standard and enhanced returns for Nash equilibrium 
appropriation, it is clear that enhancing the resource is a desirable outcome for users: 
an equal share of the threshold would cost each individual 20 in contributions (an 
opportunity cost of 100 foregone from investment in the private account) and would 
yield anticipated individual gains of 160 in the appropriation stage. However, it is not 
worthwhile for an individual to unilaterally pay the opportunity cost of enhancement 
(500). In the voting mechanism, voting “yes” is a weakly dominant strategy for all 
players, so we expect the vote to pass. In the PPM, there is a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium in which the resource is enhanced, with each user contributing 20, but there  
 
Table 1. Experimental design. 
 
is also a free-riding Nash equilibrium in which each user contributes zero, and the 
resource remains unenhanced. Due to the presence of possible free-riding, we suspect 
that enhancement will occur less frequently in the PPM than in the voting mechanism. 
 
Regardless of the mechanism used for providing the resource, the standard game-
theoretic approach yields Nash equilibrium appropriation that, conditional on the stock 
of the resource, does not depend on the way the resource is determined. Therefore, the 
Nash prediction of appropriation is 36 per user if the resource is unenhanced and 60 per 
user if the resource is enhanced, independent of whether the resource is determined 
exogenously, or endogenously through voting or a PPM. Nonetheless, previous work 
suggests the origin of the resource might influence appropriative behavior. The 
experiment is designed to examine this possibility. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design, which consists of two baseline treatments 
and two provision treatments. The two baseline treatments, enhanced baseline and 
standard baseline, follow the typical CPR experimental framework in that subjects only 
play the appropriation stage (no provision stage). The rate of return from the CPR is 
exogenously provided and is based on S0 in the standard baseline 5 and ST in the 
enhanced baseline. In the provision treatments, subjects participate in a provision stage 
before the appropriation stage and endogenously determine the rate of return from the 
resource through voting in the Vote treatment, and through a provision point mechanism 
in the PPM treatment. 
 
We conducted six sessions—one for each of the baseline treatments, and two sessions 
for each of the provision treatments. We used a “between-subjects” design in which 
each subject only participated in one treatment. Each session contained three groups in 
a partner design and lasted for 20 periods. The partner design opens channels for 
reciprocal behavior and is consistent with previous CPR experiments and observations 
in the field where CPRs are used over an extended period of time by the same 
population. 
 
All sessions were conducted in an experimental economics laboratory at a large public 
university, with a total of 90 participants recruited from the undergraduate student 
population. The experiment was computerized using Fischbacher (2007)’s z-Tree, and a 
moderator explained all instructions (available from authors upon request) to the 
students as they followed along on their individual workstations. All relevant information 
about the game was clearly explained to subjects. A short exercise tested knowledge, 
and subjects could not proceed until all questions were answered correctly. 
 
Returns from the resource were communicated to subjects using tables containing 
aggregate returns. Subjects in the standard baseline were provided tables with the 
standard aggregate returns, while subjects in the enhanced baseline were provided 
tables with the enhanced aggregate returns. Subjects in the provision treatments were 
provided tables with both the standard and enhanced aggregate returns. If the vote 
passed in the voting treatment, or if the threshold was at least met in the PPM 
treatment, then subjects used the enhanced table, otherwise subjects used the standard 
table. 
 
Table 2. Summary of group provision by treatment. 
 
 
Experimental earnings were denominated in tokens and were converted into $US at a 
rate of $0.001 per token at the end of the session. Subjects could conceivably lose 
money in a period (none did) or earn as much as $2.60. Game-theoretic play with 
enhanced provision in every period would yield $20.00 for the session including a $5 
show-up fee, which is very close to the payment average of $19.24.6 Sessions took 
slightly less than an hour on average. 
 
 
4. Results 
We organize the results by first looking separately at the outcomes of the provision and 
appropriation stages, and then exploring potential linkages between them. 
 
4.1. Provision stage 
Table 2 presents the details on the group contributions and outcomes in the provision 
stage of the game. Mean group contributions are similar across the treatments (p = 0.46 
7), registering 93.3 in the Vote treatment and 97.4 in the PPM treatment. This finding 
persists through the final five periods. Indeed, Fig. 2 illustrates relatively consistent 
contributions over time, which corresponds to previous work on voting and provision 
point mechanisms ( Walker et al., 2000 and Croson and Marks, 2000). 
 
Differences emerge when we consider the rate of resource enhancement. In the Vote 
treatment, the resource is enhanced in 93.3 percent of cases, while enhancement 
occurs in only 63.3 percent of cases in the PPM treatment (p = 0.02). This difference in 
resource enhancement remains even when we only consider the final five periods. 
Thus, while the voting and PPM mechanisms generate similar contributions, the voting 
mechanism is more effective in translating the contributions into successful resource 
enhancement. This finding is consistent with previous findings that a binding vote 
mechanism is effective at coordinating collective action ( Walker et al., 2000 and Kroll et 
al., 2007). 
 
4.2. Appropriation stage 
Table 3 reports the conditional means of group appropriation for each treatment. Joint 
tests reveal that appropriation levels are statistically equivalent across treatments 
conditional on the stock of the resource (standard: p = 0.56; enhanced: p = 0.34). 
Comparing appropriation levels to game-theoretic predictions, we find that the Nash 
solution concept organizes the data well. Appropriation levels are statistically equivalent 
to the game-theoretic predictions in four of the six cases, with differences  
 
 
Fig. 2. Mean group provision 
 
Table 3. Mean group appropriation by treatment and provision decision. 
 
 
arising in the standard baseline (p < 0.01) and in the enhanced PPM (p = 0.06). But 
even these two differences diminish or disappear in the final five periods. 8 Fig. 3 
illustrates these findings by showing appropriation as a percentage of the Nash 
prediction over the 20 periods—behavior is strikingly similar across treatments and 
closely corresponds to game-theoretic predictions. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Mean group appropriation as a percentage of Nash appropriation. 
 
4.3. Linking provision and appropriation 
We now consider how individual appropriation decisions might be influenced by the 
provision stage. In Table 4, we report the conditional means for individual appropriation 
across the person's provision decision and the group's success or failure to enhance the 
resource. The numbers reveal some patterns that are consistent with strategic 
reciprocity. In the voting treatment, when the resource is enhanced, group members 
that voted for enhancement in the provision stage appropriate at the Nash equilibrium 
level (59.9 vs. 60.0, p = 0.95). But when enhancement fails, the members that 
supported enhancement appropriate far more than predicted (54.6 vs. 36.0, p = 0.03), 
despite the fact that higher levels of appropriation reduce their expected individual 
payoff as well as the group's payoff. This is consistent with cooperative members 
punishing the group (at a cost) for its failure to enhance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Mean individual appropriation by provision decision and outcome. 
 
 
Table 5. Random effects model of individual appropriation: between treatment behavior. 
 
 
the resource—i.e., negative reciprocity. Turning to the PPM treatment, we see a 
different form of reciprocity. When the group fails to enhance the resource, the 
members that supported enhancement by contributing at cooperative levels (ci ≥ 20) 
appropriate at levels marginally similar to the game-theoretic prediction (39.4 vs. 36.0, 
p = 0.10). But when the group successfully enhances the resource, members that 
cooperated in the provision stage (ci ≥ 20) appropriate significantly less than predicted, 
even though the lower appropriation increases the group's payoff at the expense of their 
own (52.0 vs. 60, p = 0.02). 10 This is consistent with cooperative members rewarding 
the group (at a cost) for successfully enhancing the resource—i.e., positive reciprocity. 
 
We also observe one other deviation from the game-theoretic prediction—when the 
group successfully enhanced the resource, the members that vote in opposition to 
enhancement appropriate significantly less than predicted (52.7 vs. 60.0; p = 0.01). This 
pattern is also consistent with reciprocal behavior—after learning their prior non-
cooperative behavior was in the minority, they signal cooperation by restraining 
appropriation to enhance the group's payoff at a cost to their own. 
 
4.4. Conditional analyses 
We follow these aggregate numbers with conditional analyses of individual 
appropriation behavior. For a between-treatment analysis we estimate the treatment 
effects on appropriation levels with the following model: 
 
(6)     
 
 
Table 6. Random effects model of individual appropriation: within treatment behavior. 
 
 
where the dependent variable, ait − aNE, denotes the difference between the ith subject's 
appropriation from the CPR in period t and the Nash prediction; τi is a vector of indicator 
variables which specify the treatment for subject i; xit indicates whether the CPR is 
enhanced or not (=1 if enhanced; 0 otherwise); ωi captures individual subject effects; ψt 
captures period-specific effects; and εit represents the contemporaneous error term. 11 
In addition to a pooled model, we estimate enhanced and standard models, which 
clarify any treatment effect specific to the provision mechanism. 
 
Table 5 presents estimated coefficients based on (6) for the pooled, enhanced and 
standard models. Results correspond to the two conclusions drawn from the aggregate 
data. First, the Nash solution concept performs well in organizing appropriation 
decisions, with observed behavior statistically matching game theoretic predictions in 
eight of the nine cases. The exception is a significantly lower level of appropriation in 
the PPM treatment, which is consistent with the finding reported in Table 3 of 
significantly lower than Nash group appropriation in the enhanced PPM. Second, the 
origin of the resource does not influence appropriation behavior. Appropriation is 
statistically equivalent whether the resource is exogenously or endogenously provided, 
and equivalent across the two endogenous provision mechanisms. 
 
Turning to a within-treatment analysis, we explore behavioral linkages between the 
provision and appropriation of the resource by estimating the following model with data 
from the two provision treatments: 
 
(7)     
 
where the dependent variable, ait − aNE difference between the ith subject's 
appropriation from the CPR in period t and the Nash prediction; Mit is a vector of 
indicator variables indicating whether subject i exhibited support for CPR enhancement 
in period t (=1 if true; 0 otherwise) and whether her group successfully enhanced the 
resource (=1 if “yes”; 0 otherwise) 12; xPPMi indicates whether the provision mechanism is 
a vote or PPM (=1 PPM; 0 otherwise); ωi and ψt capture subject- and period-specific 
effects; and εit represents the contemporaneous error term. We estimate a pooled 
model that includes data from both the voting and PPM treatments, and two treatment-
specific models that only include data from the voting or the PPM treatment. 
 
From this specification, we obtain pooled and treatment-specific conditional estimates of 
how individual appropriation behavior deviates from theory in the four possible 
outcomes of the provision stage: (1) the individual supported enhancement of the 
resource and it was enhanced; (2) the individual opposed enhancement of the resource, 
but it was enhanced; (3) the individual supported enhancement of the resource, but 
enhancement failed; (4) the individual opposed enhancement of the resource and 
enhancement failed. Results are reported in Table 6. In eight of the twelve cases, tests 
fail to reject the null hypothesis that individual appropriation is the same as the Nash 
prediction, thereby providing additional empirical evidence for the Nash equilibrium 
concept. Of interest are the cases in which behavior significantly deviates from theory. 
In the vote treatment, when the group fails to enhance the resource, the members that 
supported enhancement appropriate marginally significantly more than predicted 
(p = 0.10), although not significantly more than their non-cooperative counterparts 
(p = 0.21). In the PPM treatment, when the resource is successfully enhanced, the 
members that cooperated (ci ≥ 20) appropriate significantly less than predicted 
(p < 0.01) and significantly less than their non-cooperative counterparts (p = 0.06). Also 
in the PPM treatment, estimates indicate the members that chose not to cooperate in a 
successful provision of the resource appropriate significantly less than predicted. The 
results therefore corroborate the finding that individual behavior is consistent with 
reciprocal behavior, and in particular, consistent with efforts to facilitate cooperation in 
resource enhancement with negative reciprocity in the voting treatment (i.e., a stick) and 
positive reciprocity in the PPM treatment (i.e., a carrot). 
 
We extend the analysis to investigate possible dynamic effects—i.e., whether behavior 
in one period is significantly influenced by behavior in prior periods. We test for three 
potential sources of dynamic effects: the influence of prior provision decisions on 
current provision decisions, the influence of prior appropriation decisions on current 
provision decisions, and the influence of prior appropriation decisions on current 
appropriation decisions. In each case, we find no evidence of dynamic effects.13 We do 
find that a member's past appropriation behavior is a reasonable predictor of her current 
appropriation behavior, but prior group outcomes do not explain current appropriation 
behavior. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The extensive experimental literature on social dilemmas has greatly enhanced our 
understanding of how behavioral and institutional elements affect cooperative solutions 
to collective-action problems. Existing research focuses on either the public good game 
or the common-pool resource game, but there are many settings that are best 
characterized by considering these two games jointly. Herein we construct a dual social 
dilemma in which the potential benefits of a common-pool resource are endogenously 
determined by the voting decisions or voluntary contributions of group members to 
develop the resource. This framework allows an examination of two lines of inquiry in 
the literature. First, we examine whether appropriation behavior is affected by the origin 
of the common-pool resource, and second, we examine whether people identify and 
utilize opportunities for strategic reciprocity to facilitate cooperative behavior. 
 
Results show the Nash solution concept is a powerful predictor of behavior in our dual 
social dilemma setting. The observed levels of appropriation are remarkably consistent 
with game-theoretic predictions whether the resource was endogenously or 
exogenously determined and whether the resource was enhanced or not. This result 
stands in contrast to other studies that have found the origin of resources can influence 
behavior in a public good game (e.g., Harrison, 2007 and Kroll et al., 2007). The finding 
that the origin of the common-pool resource did not affect appropriation behavior 
provides additional confidence in the generalizability of previous experimental studies 
that employ exogenously provided resources. 
 
This result however comes with a caveat. While endogenously determining the resource 
did not significantly affect group appropriation levels, it did lead to significant differences 
in individual behavior that are consistent with strategic reciprocity. In particular, when 
the resource was provided through a voting mechanism, users appear to punish the 
group for failed resource enhancement by being less cooperative in appropriation, but 
when the resource was provided via a provision-point mechanism, users appear to 
reward the group for successful resource enhancement by being more cooperative in 
appropriation. The dual social dilemma opened channels for strategic reciprocity, and 
our results suggest that group members identified and utilized these channels. Thus, 
endogenous provision appears to have affected individual behavior, but in our settings, 
these influences did not translate to impacts on overall appropriation. Changes to the 
setting, such as the parameters or provision mechanism, could affect individual 
behavior in ways that lead to an impact on overall appropriation. Considering the 
relevance of endogenously determined resources, future efforts should further explore 
how provision affects the use of common-pool resources. 
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